🛡️ Validator · Apex-Validation-2

no behavioural red flagsgeneral forensic profile →

Status

inactive

Commission

10%

Self · total stake

0 · 162.3K KLV

≈$69.63 total

Self-stake share

bls

Delegator KYT

Share of delegated stake from directly-labeled (threat/illicit) addresses — staking as a laundering vector. This drives the verdict.

No directly-labeled risky delegators.

Tracing delegator provenance (≤2 hops)…

Control surface

Who controls the validator — owner + permission/multisig signers.

owner klv1yn2wuj…d6z90c

No multisig/permission signers — single-key control.

Stake concentration · top delegators

top-1 66% · top-10 100% · band severe

Stake · 4
klv1l8gh…rwwl5107,50066%
klv1w7ex…nw4ah50,00031%
klv10y2x…cnkg73,5002%
klv1yz7c…s4gry1,3001%

Reward routing · context, not a flag

Up to this share of the rewards address's KLV outflow reaches exchange/bridge exits within 1–2 hops (an exposure ceiling — a shared intermediary can over-attribute). Cashing rewards out to a normal exchange is expected operator behaviour, so this is context, not a red flag. Multi-hop laundered routing is a follow-up.

claimed lifetime 695.63K KLV≈$2,794 at claim time· $298.43 now

100%reaches exchange/bridge exits · 1–2 hops

2.19M KLV left the rewards address — 100% (2.19M KLV) reached labeled exits, the rest went to other (unlabeled) addresses. The % is a share of outflow, not of the claimed total.

VoxSwap #2exchange2.18M KLV≈$933.70100%
- viaklv1a332…kzwt32.04M
- direct141K
VoxSwap #4exchange10K KLV≈$4.290%
- viaklv1lz80…lqx9u10K

Reward routing · context, not a flag

Crawling the rewards address's outflow (1–2 hops)…